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Abstract
Using a G-5 country sample (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) from 1980 to 
2007, I find new evidence of the asymmetry in firms’ mechanisms of cash holdings adjust-
ments. They undertake different approaches to move toward their target cash holdings lev-
els conditional on whether they have below- or above-target cash holdings. Specifically, 
firms with above-target cash holdings adjust mainly via changes in cash flows from financ-
ing and investing. They generally reduce their levels of equity proceeds, net debt issues and 
fixed asset disposal but increase their levels of equity repurchases, dividend payout, net 
assets from acquisitions, portfolio and short-term investments, and capital expenditures. 
However, firms with below-target cash holdings adjust mainly via changes in operating 
cash flows, i.e., they increase their levels of funds from operations but reduce their lev-
els of working capital. The mechanisms undertaken by firms with above-target cash hold-
ings allow them to adjust toward their target cash holdings relatively faster than those with 
below-target cash holdings, as they possibly incur lower costs than the mechanisms expe-
rienced by firms with below-target cash holdings. The results highlight the importance of 
understanding the asymmetry in firms’ mechanisms of cash holdings adjustments when 
analyzing how they adjust toward their target cash holdings levels.
Keywords Cash holdings · Adjustment mechanisms · Adjustment costs · Asymmetric 
adjustments
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In the corporate cash holdings literature, firms’ cash holdings behaviors have been exam-
ined using frameworks largely similar to those employed by studies on corporate capital 
structures. For example, following the trade-off theory of corporate capital structures, the 
trade-off view1 holds that firms derive their target levels of cash holdings through bal-
ancing between the marginal benefits of cash (e.g., the avoidance of costs of transaction, 
adverse selection, and agency of external financing and a better ability to undertake invest-
ment opportunities) and its marginal costs (e.g., opportunity costs of holding low-return 
assets and the increase in marginal tax rates and agency costs of managerial discretion) and 
actively adjust toward these over time2 (Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Dittmar 
and Duchin 2010; Venkiteshwaran 2011; Jiang and Lie 2016; Orlova and Rao 2018). In 
addition, their adjustment speeds are generally swifter when firms have above-target cash 
holdings i.e., their actual levels are higher than their target levels of cash holdings than 
when they have below-target cash holdings i.e., their actual levels are lower than their target 
levels of cash holdings possibly due to lower adjustment costs (Dittmar and Duchin 2010; 
Jiang and Lie 2016; Orlova and Rao 2018). However, very little has been known about the 
mechanisms undertaken by firms to move toward their target levels of cash holdings. This 
paper aims to provide a comprehensive examination of the mechanisms firms choose to 
undertake to move toward their target levels of cash holdings conditional on whether they 
have below- or above-target cash holdings using a G-5 country sample (France, Germany, 
Japan, the UK, and the US). Yet, it seems intuitive that different firms do not undertake 
similar mechanisms to move toward their target levels of cash holdings as they are subject 
to different levels of costs of deviations from target cash holdings and costs of adjustments. 
Examining such mechanisms may provide a sound justification for the asymmetry in firms’ 
speeds of adjustments reported in the existing corporate cash holdings literature.
Although there has been some research on firms’ asymmetric adjustments toward tar-
get cash holdings i.e., different speeds of adjustments contingent on the position relative 
to their target cash holdings which are driven by differences in costs of deviations from 
target cash holdings which are defined as the differences between firms’ target levels and 
their actual levels of cash holdings, costs of adjustments, and levels of financial constraints 
(Opler et al. 1999; Dittmar and Duchin 2010; Venkiteshwaran 2011; Jiang and Lie 2016; 
Orlova and Rao 2018), very little has been known about the mechanisms they may under-
take to adjust toward their target cash holdings. Dittmar and Duchin (2010), Jiang and 
Lie (2016) and Orlova and Rao (2018) show that firms with excess cash or above-target 
cash holdings may adjust toward their target cash holdings faster than those with a cash 
shortage due to lower costs of adjustments. In contrast, (Venkiteshwaran 2011) finds that 
2 In line with studies on leverage rebalancing (Leary and Roberts 2005; Strebulaev 2007) that imperfect 
capital markets or costs of adjustments may prevent firms from undertaking continuous adjustments to 
rebalance their leverage, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that on average, UK firms may adjust toward their 
target cash holdings levels at speeds of from 54 to 60% each year which are comparable to those reported 
by Venkiteshwaran (2011) (higher than 50%) but faster than those reported by Opler et al. (1999) (from 33 
to 35%) and Dittmar and Duchin (2010) (from 20 to 40%) for US firms.
1 Different from the trade-off view, the financing hierarchy view which follows the pecking-order theory of 
corporate capital structures suggests that firms have no optimal levels of cash holdings (Myers and Majluf 
1984). There is a negative relation between their cash balances and investment opportunities as firms prefer 
to finance their investment opportunities with internal funds for information asymmetries may make exter-
nal financing become expensive.
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cash-deficient firms or those with below-target cash holdings may adjust more quickly due 
to higher costs of deviations caused by their financial constraints. These studies consider 
the role of financial constraints, costs of adjustments and costs of deviations from targets 
on firms’ speeds of adjustments which are more or less related to adjustments in cash flows 
from financing (CFF) i.e., adjustments are made through debt issue/retirement and/or 
equity issue/repurchase decisions. The role of costs associated with adjustments in cash 
flows from operating (CFO) and cash flows from investing (CFI), however, has received 
almost no attention. This is surprising since firms may adjust toward their target cash hold-
ings through adjustments in not only CFF but also CFO and CFI. For example, in addi-
tion to distributing some of their excess cash to shareholders through dividend increases 
or stock repurchases and retiring part of their debt, firms with excess cash may increase 
their net working capital (e.g., stocking more inventories, piling up more accounts receiv-
able and reducing accounts payable) and investments (e.g., increasing capital expenditures 
and acquisitions)—mechanisms opposite to those undertaken by cash-deficient firms. Pre-
vious studies tend to treat these adjustments as exogenous, independent of firms’ cash and 
leverage management policies. I now explicitly account for these. I investigate why firms’ 
speeds of adjustments may vary contingent on the position relative to their target cash 
holdings by examining the possible mechanisms they may undertake to adjust toward their 
target cash holdings which include adjustments in all of the three cash flow categories.
There may be certain costs associated with adjustments in CFO. A decrease in firms’ 
working capital, for instance, may involve an increase in their accounts payable and/or a 
reduction in their accounts receivable and inventories. Increasing accounts payable may 
lead to worsened credit reputation, forgone cash discounts, increased administration costs 
and prices set by suppliers, late payment penalties, and damaged relationships with sup-
pliers (Wu et al. 2012). According to García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2010), supplier 
financing may turn out to be more costly than other sources of financing and firms there-
fore try to avoid using it when possible. Meanwhile, a reduction in accounts receivable may 
imply stricter credit terms which then result in declined sales and worsened relationships 
with customers (Brealey et al. 2014). Finally, when inventories are reduced not because of 
better inventory management, firms may be unable to fill up their customers’ orders, sug-
gesting high inventory shortage costs.
Similarly, adjustments in CFI may incur significant costs. Managers of cash-rich firms 
are likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions (Harford 2002; Harford et  al. 2012) as 
their compensation is usually increased after these (Bliss and Rosen 2001; Harford and 
Li 2007). Costs of adjustments hence may be embodied in a decrease in the value of these 
firms. When cash-deficient firms have to give up positive NPV (net present value) invest-
ments, these costs may be the opportunity costs arising from forgone future cash flows 
generated by these investments, as implied by the pecking-order view.
Examining relevant costs associated with firms’ cash holdings adjustments in the G-5 
countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) during the 1980–2007 period, 
consistent with the existing literature, I find that there is asymmetry in firms’ adjustments. 
Firms with above-target cash holdings move toward their target cash holdings faster than 
those with below-target cash holdings. In addition, the most important finding of my study 
is that there is asymmetry in the mechanisms firms undertake to move toward their target 
cash holdings. Specifically, I find new evidence that in addition to adjustments in CFF, 
firms also adjust toward their target cash holdings through adjustments in CFO and CFI. 
Firms with excess cash generally reduce CFF and CFO and increase CFI—mechanisms 
opposite to those undertaken by firms with below-target cash holdings. The mechanisms 
undertaken by firms with above-target cash holdings may incur lower costs for three 
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reasons. First, costs associated with debt retirements, equity repurchases, and dividend 
increases (CFF) may be lower than those associated with debt and equity issues and divi-
dend reductions (Leftwich and Zmijewski 1994; Byoun 2008). Second, a decrease in CFO 
is less likely to lead to costs associated with operational problems. Third, decreasing CFI 
or having to give up investment opportunities (e.g., to decrease capital expenditures and 
acquisitions) may incur huge opportunity costs associated with permanently forgone future 
cash flows generated by these. These together explain why firms with above-target cash 
holdings may adjust toward their targets faster.
I perform several additional analyses and find evidence on the influence of the magni-
tude of firms’ deviations from targets on their target adjustments. In addition to the varia-
tion in costs of adjustments caused by different mechanisms of adjustments, I argue that the 
magnitude of firms’ deviations from target cash holdings is also likely to asymmetrically 
influence their adjustments for two reasons. First, the fixed cost component (e.g., fixed 
costs of debt/equity issues, permanent losses of customers and growth opportunities, etc.) 
associated with cash holdings adjustments may suggest that firms with too much excess 
cash or a large cash shortage can adjust toward their targets faster due to lower incremental 
costs when that fixed component can be effectively “shared” with transaction costs that 
incur when firms offset their large cash holdings imbalances. In contrast, those that are 
not sufficiently far away from their target cash holdings may have fewer incentives to off-
set their cash holdings imbalances. Second, agency theories would suggest that firms with 
too much excess cash may face higher costs associated with the free cash flow problem 
and hence should disgorge some of their cash, thus implying faster speeds of adjustments. 
Those with a large cash shortage may also adjust toward their target cash holdings faster 
for larger costs of deviations from target cash holdings may be in the forms of operational 
problems and forgone positive NPV investments. Consistent with the “shared” fixed cost 
argument, I find that firms with large deviations from targets adjust toward their targets 
faster as they may face lower incremental costs of adjustments. In addition, in support 
of agency theories, compared to firms with small excess cash holdings, firms with large 
excess cash holdings experience faster speeds of adjustments as the free cash flow prob-
lem may be more significant for them. Firms with a large cash shortage also adjust more 
quickly than those with a small cash shortage for they are more likely to suffer from opera-
tional problems and have to give up positive NPV investments.
In another analysis, I examine how firms’ cash holdings adjustments may be asymmetri-
cally influenced by their major characteristics such as their precautionary motives (proxied 
by firm size, cash flow volatility and dividend payout), financial constraints (proxied by 
growth opportunities and dividend payout), and corporate life-cycle (proxied by firm age). 
There is evidence that firms experience faster speeds of adjustments in the presence of 
stronger precautionary motives (smaller firm size, higher cash flow volatility and lower 
dividend payout), greater financial constraints (more growth opportunities), and lower lev-
els of maturity (younger age). However, when these factors are interacted with deviations 
from targets, their impact becomes relatively less significant (except for firm age), suggest-
ing firms’ deviations from targets may be the major driver of their target adjustments.
Overall, I contribute to the corporate cash holdings literature by studying the asymme-
try in the mechanisms firms undertake to move toward their target cash holdings which 
helps to provide a better understanding of why speeds of adjustments may vary contingent 
on whether firms have below- or above-target cash holdings. Contingent on having either 
below- or above-target cash holdings, firms may undertake different adjustments in the 
three groups of cash flows which may involve different levels of costs, thus leading to dif-
ferent speeds of adjustments i.e., firms with above-target cash holdings adjust toward their 
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targets faster than those with below-target cash holdings as their mechanisms of adjust-
ments may involve lower costs. The evidence on the asymmetry in the adjustments in CFO 
and CFI undertaken by these two groups of firms is especially novel. To the best of my 
knowledge, my study is the first attempt in the literature to look at that asymmetry.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 presents the empirical 
models. Section  3 discusses the sample. Section  4 reports the main findings. Section  5 
reports the additional empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes.
2  Empirical models and methods
To examine the asymmetry in the mechanisms undertaken by firms to move toward their 
target cash holdings conditional on the position relative to their target cash holdings, I first 
classify the sample firms into two groups with one consisting of firms with below- and 
another consisting of firms with above-target cash holdings. To do that, firms’ target lev-
els of cash holdings (CH∗
it
) must be estimated and then compared to their actual levels of 
cash holdings to see if they have below- or above-target cash holdings (Dittmar and Duchin 
2010; Jiang and Lie 2016; Orlova and Rao 2018). The unobserved CH∗
it
 is a function of 
firms’ major fundamentals, as follows:
where 𝛽 ′ is a vector of parameters estimated from a fixed-effects regression of cash hold-
ings on a vector of relevant determinants, xit:
As guided by previous studies in the current literature (Opler et  al. 1999; Ozkan and 
Ozkan 2004; Bates et al. 2009; Jiang and Lie 2016; Orlova and Rao 2018), I include in 
xit eight independent variables consisting of growth opportunities, firm size, cash flow 
volatility, cash flow, capital expenditures, net working capital, research and development 
expenses, and a dividend dummy to capture whether firms pay dividends or not. 휀
it
 is an 
error component that includes firms’ fixed effects and time effects and an i.i.d. error term. 
The firms’ fixed effects control for time-invariant unobservable, unique firm and/or indus-
try characteristics that cannot be captured by xit while the time effects allow us to exam-
ine the extent at which the change in firms’ cash holdings can be effectively explained by 
changes in their fundamentals rather than the evolution of time (Bates et  al. 2009). The 
relations between these eight variables included in xit and firms’ target cash holdings are as 
follows.
Growth opportunities (GO) This is the sum of the market value of equity or market 
capitalization and the book value of total debt scaled by the book value of total assets. The 
precautionary motive argument suggests a positive relation between firms’ growth oppor-
tunities and their cash holdings since costs associated with adverse cash flow shocks and 
financial distress may be more significant among high-growth firms (Opler et  al. 1999; 
Bates et  al. 2009). Due to more information asymmetries, high-growth firms are more 
likely to give up positive NPV investments in the presence of a cash shortage and costly 
external financing, thus needing to hold more cash. In contrast, low-growth firms should 
hold less cash to reduce the free cash flow problem (Jensen 1986).
Firm size (FS) This is the natural log of the book value of total assets measured in 1980 
US$ value. There may be a negative relation between firms’ size and their cash holdings 



















should hold less cash due to the presence of economies of scale i.e., lower transaction costs 
when their noncash financial assets are converted into cash (Baumol 1952; Miller and Orr 
1966; Mulligan 1997). Second, as large firm size indicates less financial distress, fewer 
information asymmetries and hence better access to external capital markets, in the spirit 
of the precautionary motive argument (Almeida et al. 2005), large firms can hold less cash. 
Finally, Sufi (2009) shows that large firms may have more access to bank lines of credit—a 
close alternative to cash, thus having less need to hoard it.
Cash flow volatility (CFV) This is the absolute value of the difference between the first 
difference of cash flow (% change) and the average of first differences. Consistent with the 
precautionary motive argument, firms with riskier cash flows should accumulate more cash 
to cope with potential adverse cash flow shocks in the presence of costly external financing 
better (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009). This indicates a positive relation between this 
variable and firms’ cash holdings.
Cash flows (CF) This is operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, 
income taxes and total dividends paid scaled by the book value of total assets. Firms with 
stronger cash flows may have a better ability to accumulate more cash, as suggested by the 
pecking-order view. In addition, these firms may be also those with more growth oppor-
tunities and hence need to hold more cash (Opler et  al. 1999; Bates et  al. 2009). These 
together suggest a positive relation between cash flows and cash holdings.
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) This is capital expenditures scaled by the book value 
of total assets. There are two opposite predictions on the impact of this variable on firms’ 
target cash holdings. On the one hand, in line with the pecking-order view, Riddick and 
Whited (2009) find that firms which are making significant investments in assets may 
experience a temporary fall in their cash. In addition, when capital expenditures lead to 
an increase in assets that can serve as collaterals better (e.g., fixed assets) and hence firms’ 
debt capacities, they may have less need to hoard cash. These together suggest that cash 
holdings may be inversely related to capital expenditures. On the other hand, according to 
the trade-off view, it is possible that firms which are making significant capital expendi-
tures may be high-growth ones, thus needing to hold more cash.
Net working capital (NWC) This is the difference between working capital and cash and 
cash equivalents scaled by the book value of total assets. As net working capital includes 
highly liquid assets that can be considered as close substitutes for cash (e.g., inventories 
and accounts receivable), firms with a higher level of net working capital are likely to hold 
less cash (Bates et al. 2009).
Research and development expenses (R&D) This is research and development expenses 
scaled by total sales. Since these expenses may be considered as a close proxy for growth 
opportunities and hence costs associated with financial distress and adverse cash flow 
shocks, the trade-off view suggests firms which are incurring more research and devel-
opment expenses should hold more cash. Consistent with this view, Brown and Petersen 
(2011) show that in the presence of financing frictions, firms tend to depend intensively on 
cash to smooth their research and development expenses for adjustments in these expenses 
usually involve high costs (e.g., wages of highly skilled technology workers). In contrast, 
the financing hierarchy suggests a negative relation between such expenses and cash hold-
ings as firms which are incurring large amounts of these may temporarily experience a fall 
in their cash balances.
Dividend dummies This variable is defined to be 1 for firms that pay dividends and 0 
otherwise. Fazzari et  al. (1988) find that financially unconstrained (possibly cash-rich) 
firms are more likely to pay dividends than financially constrained firms. Almeida et  al. 
(2005) and Bates et al. (2009), however, show that firms that pay dividends may hold less 
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cash for they may be considered by investors as less risky and hence have better access to 
external capital markets.
After estimating firms’ target cash holdings, I define firms as having above- or below-
target cash holdings if their cash ratios in the last accounting period (CH
it−1) are higher 











 . The prior literature shows that firms’ 
speeds of adjustments vary conditional on whether they have below- or above-target cash 
holdings. To see how deviations from target cash holdings may asymmetrically influence 
firms’ target cash holdings adjustments, I follow the prior literature by introducing the fol-




 is the difference between firms’ cash ratios (e.g., cash and cash equivalents 
scaled by total assets) for the current (CH
it
) and the last (CH
it−1) accounting periods. CDevit 
is deviations from target cash holdings and is defined as the difference between firms’ 









it−1). CHait (CHbit) indicates that 
firms have above-target (below-target) cash holdings in the last accounting period. Within 
1 year, firms partially adjust toward their target cash holdings at the speed of adjustment 휆1 
(if they have above-target cash holdings) or 휆2 (if they have below-target cash holdings). 
The current literature on corporate capital structures suggests that costs of adjustments may 
prevent firms from undertaking continuous leverage adjustments (Leary and Roberts 2005; 
Strebulaev 2007). Borrowing that line of argument, 휆1 and 휆2 are expected to be between 0 
and 1 with a higher value indicating a faster speed of adjustment. In addition, since it may 
be less costly for firms to disgorge than to build up cash reserves, firms with above-target 
cash holdings are likely to adjust faster than those with below-target cash holdings i.e., 
𝜆1 > 𝜆2.
After classifying firms into two groups i.e., those with below- and those with above-
target cash holdings and examining their speeds of cash holdings adjustments, the most 
important task is to look at how they make adjustments in each of the three cash flow cat-
egories to move toward their target cash holdings. I argue that in addition to adjustments 
in CFF which are determined by financial constraints and costs of external financing, firms 
can also adjust toward their target cash holdings by adjusting CFO and CFI. Those with 
above-target cash holdings may reduce CFF (e.g., to retire debt, repurchase equity, and 
increase dividends) and/or CFO (e.g., to reduce funds from operations and increase work-
ing capital), and/or increase CFI (e.g., to invest more in capital expenditures and make 
more acquisitions), mechanisms opposite to those undertaken by firms with below-target 
cash holdings and these different mechanisms of adjustments may have important adjust-
ment cost implications.
First, one would expect that it is relatively less costly for firms to retire debt, repur-
chase equity, and increase dividends than otherwise (Leftwich and Zmijewski 1994; Byoun 
2008). Second, as investment opportunities imply potential cash flows generated in the 
future, opportunity costs may incur when firms have to forgo positive NPV investments 
(e.g., to decrease capital expenditures and make fewer acquisitions) due to a cash shortage 
and costly external financing. Minton and Schrand (1999) find that firms’ liquidity con-
straints may force them to permanently forgo their investment opportunities rather than 
changing their timing.
Third, it may be easier and less costly for firms with above-target cash holdings to 
reduce CFO than for those with below-target cash holdings to increase it. In particular, the 
(3)ΔCHit = 휆0 + 휆1CDevitCHait + 휆2CDevitCHbit + 휀it,
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former firms can reduce CFO by increasing working capital. An increase in working capi-
tal can be achieved by increasing inventories and/or accounts receivable and/or reducing 
accounts payable. Compared to a decrease in inventories, an increase in inventories is less 
likely to cause any significant impact on firms’ ability to meet customers’ demand, thus 
lowering inventory shortage costs. While costs of holding inventories can be reasonably 
measured, it is hard to estimate costs of lost sales due to an inventory shortage (Chiang 
and Monahan 2005). Hence, firms may be unwilling to reduce their inventories to avoid 
such costs unless they can manage inventories more effectively. Next, contrary to a fall in 
accounts receivable which suggests tightened credit terms, an increase in these may imply 
firms are extending credit to their customers, thus facilitating sales. Finally, it may be eas-
ier for firms to reduce than to increase accounts payable for the reasons discussed earlier.
3  Data, sample selection and descriptive statistics
My sample includes non-financial firms in the G-5 countries for the 1980–2007 period. 
Similar to Jiang and Lie (2016), I stop before the financial crisis, during which period, the 
determinants of cash holding are quite different from those during the non-crisis period. 
The sample firms’ accounting data are collected from Datastream Worldscope. To run two-
step SYS-GMM (System Generalized Method of Moments) regressions, the sample firms 
are required to have at least five consecutive annual observations. Those with SIC code 
from 6000 to 6999 (financial firms) and from 4000 to 4999 (utility firms) are excluded 
from the sample as they are heavily regulated and hence may exhibit atypical cash hold-
ings behaviors. To remove outliers, I winsorize all the variables of interest at the 0.5% and 
99.5% percentiles. Finally, I have a sample with 103,562 firm-year observations. Table 1 
provides the statistics summary for the variables considered in the study. The size of the 
standard deviations indicates a reasonable level of variation in my sample which is compa-
rable to that of previous studies.
4  Empirical results
4.1  Determinants of cash holdings and the asymmetry in speeds of adjustments
My unreported fixed-effects estimation results for the target cash holdings model are gener-
ally consistent with previous empirical evidence (e.g., Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan 
2004; Dittmar and Duchin 2010; Venkiteshwaran 2011; Jiang and Lie 2016; Orlova and 
Rao 2018). In particular, in line with the precautionary motive argument and the trade-off 
view of cash holdings, firms’ cash holdings are positively related to their growth opportu-
nities and research and development expenses. The impact of cash flow volatility is negli-
gible. Consistent with both the transaction cost and precautionary motive arguments and 
the credit line argument; larger firm size reduces firms’ need to hoard cash due to the pres-
ence of economies of scale, fewer information asymmetries, and more access to bank lines 
of credit. There is, however, evidence that cash is positively related to cash flows which is 
in support of Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) that firms with stronger cash flows 
tend to accumulate more cash and may have more growth opportunities. Consistent with 
Fazzari et al. (1988) that financially unconstrained (possibly cash-rich) firms are likely to 
pay dividends, I find evidence that firms that pay dividends hoard more cash. Finally, I 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































show that both capital expenditures and net working capital have a significant, negative 
impact on cash holdings. This finding is consistent with Bates et al. (2009) and Riddick 
and Whited (2009) that significant investments in assets may temporarily reduce firms’ 
cash holdings and net working capital may reduce firms’ need to hold cash since it contains 
highly liquid assets which can be considered as close substitutes for cash.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the asymmetric partial adjustment model as 
specified by Eq.  (3). These results strongly support the trade-off view of corporate cash 
holdings that there is asymmetry in firms’ speeds of adjustments. Conditional on having 
above-target cash holdings, firms adjust toward their target cash holdings at speeds which 
are both economically and statistically faster than speeds of adjustments of firms with 
below-target cash holdings, as indicated by the F-tests. Such evidence would suggest that 
on average, speeds of adjustments for firms in the five sample countries may be 13–24% 
faster when they have above- than when they have below-target cash holdings.
4.2  Main results—the asymmetry in mechanisms of cash holdings adjustments
4.2.1  Mechanisms of adjustments among firms with above‑target cash holdings
Table 3 provides detailed explanations on why firms with above-target cash holdings may 
adjust toward their targets faster. There is evidence that these firms reduce CFF (across 
Table 2  Target cash holdings 
adjustments conditional on 
deviations from target cash 
holdings
This table presents the SYS-GMM regression results for 
firms’ asymmetric partial target adjustments conditional on 
deviations from target cash holdings, as modeled by Eq.  (3): 
ΔCH
it








, where ΔCHit is the 
change in cash holdings ratios. Target cash holdings are estimated by 
Eq.  (2). See the “Appendix” for variables’ definitions. CDevit is the 
difference between cash holdings in the last period and target cash 
holdings for the current period. CHita (CHitb) is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if cash holdings are higher than or equal to (lower than) targets 
and 0 otherwise. My sample includes 103,562 firm-year observations 
for France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US over the 1980–2007 
period. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. F-test reports the 
p-value of the F-test for the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients 
of speeds of adjustments for firms with above- and those with below-
target cash holdings are equal. AR2 reports the p-value of the test for 
no second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. ** and * 
indicate that the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1, and 5% 
levels of significance, respectively































AR2 0.08 0.40 0.03 0.23 0.00
F-test [(i) = (ii)] 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 7477 5230 28,035 18,192 44,628
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firms in all countries) and CFO (except for UK firms which experience a very slight 
increase and US firms which see no change in CFO) but increase CFI (across firms in all 
countries). These mechanisms of adjustments are likely to involve lower costs of adjust-
ments, thus allowing these firms to adjust toward their targets faster to reduce potential 
costs associated with the free cash flow problem. In contrast, firms with below-target cash 
holdings undertake opposite mechanisms (to increase CFF and CFO (across firms in all 
countries) but reduce CFI (except for US firms which see no change in CFI)). The mag-
nitudes of the adjustments in each cash flow group vary significantly between these two 
groups of firms and will be discussed shortly. 
I find that overall, firms with above-target cash holdings experience a fall in their cash 
balances, as can be seen from Panel A in Table 3. Be aware that Panel A of Table 3 reports 
the magnitudes and relative ranks of the adjustments in the three cash flow groups (CFF, 
CFO, and CFI) among firms with above-target cash holdings. To make it easier to compare 
the magnitudes of firms’ cash holdings adjustments, the changes in CFF, CFO, and CFI 
are taken from Panel A in Table 4 to Panel A of Table 3. 
Adjustments in CFF Adjustments in CFF are significant across firms in all the sample 
countries (ranked 1st among French, UK, and US firms with 1.4%, 2.8%, and 2.3% of total 
assets in monetary terms, respectively) (Panel A of Table 3), especially UK and US firms 
for the magnitude of the adjustments in this cash flow group is much greater than that of 
the others.3 As can be seen from Panel A of Table 4, these firms consistently experience a 
fall in their levels of net equity issues (0.3%, 0.7%, 0.4%, 3.1%, and 2.6% of total assets in 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US, respectively), which is mainly driven by the 
decrease in their levels of equity proceeds. In addition, French, German, and Japanese firms 
also see a decline in their levels of net debt issues. These together with a slight increase in 
levels of dividend payout then lead to a significant decrease in CFF.
Table 3  Magnitudes of cash flow adjustments conditional on deviations from target cash holdings
This table represents the magnitudes of the adjustments in CFF, CFO, and CFI which are defined as 
changes in CFF, CFO, and CFI scaled by firms’ total assets conditional on their deviations from target cash 
holdings together with their relative ranks ranging from to 1 (largest) to 3 (smallest). See the “Appendix” 
for variables’ definitions
France Germany Japan UK US
% Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank
Panel A: firms with above-target cash holdings
 CFF − 1.4 [1] − 1.1 [2] − 0.8 [2] − 2.8 [1] − 2.3 [1]
 CFO − 0.6 [3] − 0.1 [3] − 0.9 [1] + 0.1 [3] 0.0 [3]
 CFI + 1.3 [2] + 1.9 [1] + 0.7 [3] + 2.3 [2] + 1.6 [2]
Panel B: firms with below-target cash holdings
 CFF + 0.8 [3] + 0.3 [3] + 0.7 [2] + 0.6 [3] + 1.8 [2]
 CFO + 1.5 [1] + 2.0 [1] + 1.3 [1] + 2.0 [2] + 2.3 [1]
 CFI − 1.1 [2] − 1.8 [2] − 0.2 [3] − 2.2 [1] 0.0 [3]
3 The adjustments in net equity issues among UK and US firms are more significant than those of firms in 
France, Germany, and France, suggesting these firms may be relatively more active in the equity market. 
Indeed, Öztekin (2015) shows that in countries with stronger shareholder rights and better enforcement of 
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Compared to their counterparts in France, Germany and Japan, UK and US firms reduce 
their levels of net equity issues very significantly (3.1% and 2.6% of total assets in mon-
etary terms, respectively) and still increase their levels of net debt issues (0.5%) (Panel A 
of Table 4).4 The net effect of these adjustments is therefore a fall in CFF. Interestingly, by 
magnitude, the increase in levels of dividend payout is smaller than the increase in levels 
of equity repurchases among UK and US firms (0.2% in each country). This finding is 
consistent with managerial perception and empirical evidence that firms’ managers prefer 
to distribute some of their firms’ excess cash in the way that is likely to establish less com-
mitment (Iyer et al. 2017).
The reason why managers prefer to distribute their firms’ excess cash to sharehold-
ers in the form of share repurchases rather than dividend increases has been discussed 
intensively. The current literature on firms’ dividend policies since Miller and Modigli-
ani (1961) suggests that investors tend to interpret firms’ dividend changes as an indicator 
of changes in their management’s view about their firms’ future prospects (Bhattacharya 
1979; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985; Best and Best 2001). An increase in 
dividends may indicate that firms’ managers are optimistic about their firms’ future while 
a fall in these implies the opposite.5 Dividend cuts therefore may be considered as a “last 
resort” action for firms and investors tend to associate these with financial problems that 
may not reverse in the near term (Teng and Hachiya 2013). Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994) 
show that a dividend reduction has much more information content about changes in firms’ 
future operations than a dividend increase as it signals serious deterioration in firms’ long-
term prospects. Hence, managers tend to be unwilling to increase dividend payments by 
large amounts as once they have done so, it may be tough for them to cut these latter dur-
ing times of adverse cash flow shocks. Equity repurchases therefore may be a much more 
flexible approach to distribute firms’ excess cash to shareholders from managers’ point of 
view.6
The evidence on the small change in firms’ dividend payout whether they experience 
above- or below-target cash holdings is particularly interesting. Apart from its implication 
about managers’ incentives to distribute their firms’ excess cash in the way that is likely to 
establish a lower level of commitment, it may also reflect firms’ attempts to smooth divi-
dends which have been acknowledged by a vast body of the current literature on corporate 
dividend policies. For example, Brav et al. (2005) find that as managers tend to believe that 
the market is likely to put a premium on firms that have stable dividend policies due to the 
signaling effect of any negative changes on these, they are willing to visit costly capital 
markets or even give up positive NPV investments rather than cutting their dividends.7
6 Another potential reason is that realizing capital gains is generally more tax efficient for shareholders 
compared to dividends.
7 Firms’ incentives for dividend smoothing can be explained by information asymmetry models (e.g., 
coarse signaling models (Kumar 1988; Kumar and Lee 2001; Guttman et al. 2010), principal-agent mod-
els (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; DeMarzo and Sannikov 2008), information asymmetry among investors 
(Brennan and Thakor 1990) and external financial constraints (Almeida et  al. 2005; Bates et  al. 2009), 
agency-based models (Jensen 1986; Allen et  al. 2002; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2007; Lambrecht and 
Myers 2010), and income smoothing models (Miller and Scholes 1978; Baker et al. 2007; Baker and Wur-
gler 2010).
4 Lee and Suh (2011) find that the increase in cash holdings prior to share repurchases is obtained from the 
decrease in firms’ capital expenditures rather than the improvement in their operating performance.
5 The literature review of Allen and Michaely (2003), however, shows that the overall accumulated empiri-
cal evidence does not support the assertion of traditional dividend signaling models that dividend changes 
convey information about firms’ future earnings as contrary to the signaling theory’s prediction; it indicates 
that there is no positive link between dividend changes and future earnings.
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Adjustments in CFI Contingent on having above-target cash holdings, French and Ger-
man firms adjust CFI mainly through adjustments in their portfolio investments, short-term 
investments, and marketable securities (Panel A of Table 4). On the contrary, as the merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&A) markets may be more active in the UK and the US, firms in 
these two countries experience a significant rise in their levels of net assets from acquisi-
tions (1.0% of total assets in monetary terms in each country). The significant increase in 
levels of net assets from acquisitions among UK and US firms is in support of Harford 
(2002) and Harford et al. (2012) that cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions 
even when their acquisitions may be value-decreasing as their managers tend to enjoy an 
increase in their compensation following these acquisitions (Bliss and Rosen 2001; Harford 
and Li 2007). Contingent on having above-target cash holdings, firms see a decrease in 
their levels of fixed asset disposal. Finally, US firms with above-target cash holdings expe-
rience the most significant increase in capital expenditures among firms in the five sample 
countries (0.5%). This finding is consistent with the statistics reported in Table 1 that these 
firms on average have most growth opportunities, as suggested by their market-to-book 
ratios.
Adjustments in CFO Firms with above-target cash holdings in Germany and the UK 
experience a small change in CFO and those in the US do not see any change in it (small-
est among the three cash flow groups) (Panel A of Table 3) as the increase in their levels 
of funds from operations closely matches with the rise in their levels of working capital 
(Panel A of Table 4). In contrast, the change in CFO is rather large for French and Japanese 
firms (0.6% and 0.9%, respectively) as their levels of working capital increase at higher 
rates than levels of funds from operations. The size mismatch between the rise in levels 
of working capital and that in levels of funds from operations among French and Japanese 
firms supports the view that in the presence of weak corporate governance, excess cash can 
be used unproductively (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). Indeed, Ando et al. (2003) find 
that corporate governance among Japanese firms overall is weak and ineffective.
4.2.2  Mechanisms of adjustments among firms with below‑target cash holdings
Next, I examine the mechanisms undertaken by firms with below-target cash holdings to 
move toward their targets. I find that these firms try to increase their cash balances, as can 
be seen from Panel B in Table 4. Further, there is evidence that overall firms with below-
target cash holdings undertake mechanisms of adjustments opposite to those undertaken 
by firms with above-target cash holdings. Panel B of Table 3 reports the magnitudes and 
relative ranks of their adjustments in the three cash flow groups. The magnitudes of these 
adjustments are taken from Panel B in Table 4.
Adjustments in CFF I find that firms with below-target cash holdings adjust toward 
their targets by increasing CFF. However, since these firms are over-levered in the previ-
ous accounting period (BLDevt−1 > 0), as shown in Panel B of Table 4, it may be costly for 
them to visit external capital markets. This is probably why the magnitude of the increase 
in CFF is particularly small among German, Japanese, and UK firms (smallest among the 
three cash flow groups) (Panel B of Table 3). Due to their significant deviations from tar-
get leverage, German firms do not experience any change in their levels of net debt issues 
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while UK firms even have to reduce them to avoid potential financial distress (Panel B of 
Table 4).8
Adjustments in CFO The change in firms’ CFO becomes an important driver of their 
cash holdings adjustments (ranked 1st in most countries) (Panel B of Table 3) in the pres-
ence of below-target cash holdings as it may be more costly for these firms to visit capital 
markets. The increase in levels of funds from operations among Japanese, UK, and US 
firms is greater when they experience below-target than when they have above-target cash 
holdings. In addition, there is evidence that the magnitude of the fall in levels of work-
ing capital among firms with below-target cash holdings is much smaller than that of the 
increase in levels of funds from operations (except for French firms where the change in 
levels of working capital is more significant and Japanese firms which see almost equal 
changes in these two items) (Panel B of Table 4), suggesting a significant improvement in 
their levels of operational efficiency.
Even when firms with below-target cash holdings need to increase cash, they may be 
still concerned about potential impacts of a significant reduction in their working capital 
on their operations as the magnitude of the decrease in their levels of working capital is 
smaller than that of the increase in levels of working capital among firms with above-target 
cash holdings. The implication here is, when these firms have to reduce working capital to 
improve CFO (e.g., to reduce inventories and accounts receivable and/or increase accounts 
payable), they still need to ensure their ability to meet their customers’ demand and offer 
them reasonable credit terms and meet their suppliers’ credit requirements.
Adjustments in CFI The presence of below-target cash holdings forces firms, especially 
those which are highly over-levered and hence may have less access to capital markets 
(e.g., German and UK firms) to reduce CFI (except for US firms) (Panel B of Table 3). 
The decrease in levels of net assets from acquisitions among German and UK firms is par-
ticularly significant. The noticeable rise in German and UK firms’ levels of fixed asset dis-
posal (Panel B of Table 4) may imply their attempts to boost operational efficiency i.e., to 
streamline their operations by selling less productive assets to improve both profitability 
and liquidity.
Overall, in support of the trade-off view, I find evidence that firms with above-target 
cash holdings experience faster speeds of adjustments since their mechanisms of adjust-
ments may incur lower costs than those undertaken by firms with below-target cash hold-
ings. These firms adjust toward their targets generally through significant changes in CFF 
(e.g., they generally decrease their levels of equity proceeds (all firms) and net debt issues 
(except for UK and US firms) but increase their levels of equity repurchases (except for 
French firms) and dividend payout (all firms)) and CFI (e.g., they generally increase their 
levels of net assets from acquisitions (all firms), portfolio and short-term investments 
(except for US firms), and capital expenditures (except for German firms) but reduce their 
levels of fixed asset disposal (all firms)) while firms with below-target cash holdings adjust 
mainly through changes in CFO i.e., to increase their levels of funds from operations but 
decrease their levels of working capital (all firms). The evidence on the asymmetry in the 
adjustments in CFO and CFI undertaken by these two groups of firms is especially novel. 
Previous studies tend to treat these adjustments as exogenous, independent of firms’ cash 
8 I find some link between cash holdings and leverage adjustments among firms with below-target cash 
holdings. Over-levered firms with large deviations from target leverage may find it harder to increase levels 
of net debt issues. Such a link is not found among those with above-target cash holdings.
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and leverage management policies but I now explicitly account for these to get a better 
insight into firms’ cash holdings adjustments.
5  Additional analyses
5.1  The asymmetry in the impact of the magnitude of deviations from targets 
on cash holdings adjustments
The magnitude of firms’ deviations from target cash holdings is likely to shape their target 
adjustments for two reasons. First, considering the magnitude of firms’ cash flow realiza-
tions, Faulkender et al. (2012) realize that the presence of large operating cash flows may 
encourage firms to adjust toward their target leverage faster as costs of leverage adjust-
ments can be effectively shared with transaction costs that incur when they offset these 
cash flow imbalances, thus lowering the marginal costs of leverage adjustments. That line 
of argument can be borrowed to explain firms’ target cash holdings adjustments contingent 
on the magnitude of their deviations from target cash holdings. In particular, I argue that 
the presence of the fixed component of costs of adjustments (e.g., fixed costs of debt/equity 
issues, permanent losses of customers and growth opportunities, etc.) may discourage 
firms with small deviations to rebalance their cash. Large deviations, however, may lead to 
lower incremental costs of adjustments as the fixed cost component can now be effectively 
“shared” with transaction costs that incur when firms offset their cash holdings imbalances 
and hence faster speeds of adjustments.
Second, agency theories argue that firms with more free cash are more likely to experi-
ence the free cash flow problem (Jensen 1986), thus having more incentives to reduce cash 
to mitigate the potential costs associated with it. Firms with a large cash shortage, however, 
are likely to have more pressures to adjust to avoid suffering from operational problems 
and having to give up positive NPV investments. These costs of deviations, however, may 
be lower for firms with little excess cash (as managers do not have much to squander) or a 
small cash shortage (as the probability of experiencing operational problems and having to 
give up positive NPV projects is lower).
To examine the impact of the magnitude of firms’ deviations from target cash holdings 
on their target adjustments, I divide both firms with above-target cash holdings and those 
with below-target cash holdings into two subgroups using the median level of deviations 
from target cash holdings for each group. My approach here extends that of Dittmar and 
Duchin (2010) as I take into account whether firms have above- or below-target cash hold-
ings while the authors do not. Firms with large (small) deviations may adjust more quickly 
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The impact of the magnitude of deviations from targets is reported in Table 5. I find 
some evidence that firms’ speeds of adjustments are also determined by how far they are 
away from their targets. The presence of the fixed cost component discourages US firms 
with small excess cash to adjust, thus leading to statistically slower speeds of adjustments 
compared to those of firms that have a lot of excess cash in the country. It is, however, 
an opposite story with Japanese firms as those with small excess cash adjust statistically 
faster, which is rather puzzling. Although speeds of adjustments for firms with above-target 
cash holdings and large deviations in France, Germany, and the UK are not statistically 
faster than those of firms with above-target cash holdings and small deviations, by mag-
nitude, the former firms adjust faster, a finding to some extent in support of the “shared” 
fixed cost argument and agency theories on costs of deviations from target cash holdings 
i.e., firms with large excess cash holdings may face lower costs of adjustments but higher 
costs of deviations associated with the free cash flow problem.
Among firms with below-target cash holdings, although speeds of adjustments do not 
statistically differ between firms with large deviations and those with small deviations, 
by magnitude, the presence of large deviations still leads to faster speeds of adjustments 
Table 5  Target cash holdings adjustments conditional on the magnitude of deviations from target cash hold-
ings
This table presents the SYS-GMM regression results for firms’ asymmetric partial target adjust-
ments conditional on the magnitude of deviations from target cash holdings, as modeled by Eq.  (4): 
ΔCH
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, where ΔCHit 
is the change in cash holdings ratios. Target cash holdings are estimated by Eq.  (2). See the “Appendix” 
for variables’ definitions. CDevit is the difference between cash holdings in the last period and target cash 
holdings for the current period. CHita (CHitb) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if cash holdings are higher than 
or equal to (lower than) targets and 0 otherwise. CDevitL (CDevitS) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if devia-
tions from target cash holdings are larger than or equal to (smaller than) the median level and 0 otherwise. 
My sample includes 103,562 firm-year observations for France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US over 
the 1980–2007 period. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. F-test reports the p-value of the F-test for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for each pair of scenarios are equal. AR2 reports the p-value of 
the test for no second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1, 
and 5% levels of significance, respectively



















































AR2 0.09 0.40 0.03 0.24 0.00
F-test [(i) = (ii)] 0.92 0.54 0.03 0.55 0.00
F-test [(iii) = (iv)] 0.04 0.95 0.69 0.34 0.08
F-test [(i) = (iii)] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-test [(ii) = (iv)] 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.54
Observations 7477 5230 28,035 18,192 44,628
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(except for Japanese firms). This evidence lends some support to the earlier argument that 
firms with a large cash shortage may need to adjust more quickly for they are more likely to 
suffer from operational problems and have to give up positive NPV investments when costs 
of adjustments can be effectively “shared”.
I find that conditional on having large deviations from targets, firms with above-target 
cash holdings adjust statistically faster than those with below-target cash holdings. A simi-
lar pattern can be also found among firms with small deviations from targets i.e., firms 
with small excess cash adjust statistically faster than those with a small cash shortage. 
These findings suggest deviations from targets i.e., whether firms have above- or below-
target cash holdings may be the major driver of their target adjustments, not the magnitude 
of these deviations.
Firms’ characteristics and actual cash holdings adjustments contingent on whether they 
have above- or below-target cash holdings and the magnitude of their deviations from tar-
gets reported in Table 6 can effectively shed light on why firms with large deviations from 
targets are likely to adjust faster than those with small ones. First, as expected, on aver-
age, firms with large deviations from targets, whether having above- or below-target cash 
holdings, in terms of absolute values, experience much more significant deviations from 
targets (from 2.8% (firms with large excess cash holdings or A-L firms in Japan) to 5.0% 
(A-L firms in the UK) of total assets) than those of firms with small deviations (from 0.5% 
(firms with small excess cash holdings or A-S firms in Japan and firms with a small cash 
shortage or B-S firms in all the sample countries with the exception of Japan) to 1.2% (A-S 
firms in the UK)). Hence, both the “shared” fixed cost argument and agency theories sug-
gest they should undertake faster adjustments.
Second, except for French firms with above-target cash holdings and small deviations 
from targets, whether having above- or below-target cash holdings, firms with small devia-
tions generally have stayed close to their target levels of leverage (especially US firms) 
(small BLDevt). This finding implies that the presence of fixed costs related to leverage 
adjustments may discourage these firms to visit external capital markets to rebalance 
their cash holdings via adjustments in CFF (Faulkender et al. 2012), which explains why 
compared to firms with large deviations, those with small ones experience much smaller 
changes in CFF in most cases.
In line with the view that excess cash tends to be used unproductively (Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith 2007), I find that the rise in A-L firms’ levels of working capital is much 
more significant than that in their levels of funds from operations as these firms collate a 
lot more accounts receivable and inventories while the improvement in their funds from 
operations is rather modest. A-L firms in Japan even experience a decline in their levels 
of funds from operations. However, when the magnitude of their excess cash holdings 
is small, they start trying to become more efficient as the growth of A-S firms’ levels of 
funds from operations starts exceeding that of their levels of working capital (except for 
A-S firms in Germany). Especially, I find that among the four groups of firms, B-L firms 
or those facing a large cash shortage across all the sample countries experience the largest 
improvement in their levels of funds from operations and the most significant reduction in 
their levels of working capital. Taken together, these findings imply that firms’ levels of 
operational efficiency vary conditional on the position relative to their target cash holdings.
Overall, I find evidence that consistent with the “shared” fixed cost argument and 
agency theories, firms with large deviations from target cash holdings adjust toward their 
target cash holdings faster than those with small deviations. Firms with small deviations 
may be discouraged to undertake adjustments possibly due to higher incremental costs of 
adjustments and lower costs of deviations. In addition, firms with a lot of excess cash do 
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not use it very productively while those with a large cash shortage experience a significant 
improvement in their levels of operational efficiency.
5.2  The asymmetry in the impact of firms’ major characteristics on cash holdings 
adjustments
In another analysis, I examine the impact of several firm-specific factors such as precau-
tionary motives of cash holdings, financial constraints, and corporate life-cycle on their 
cash holdings adjustments. These factors may affect their levels of costs of deviations, 
financial constraints, and costs of adjustments. For example, Sufi (2009) shows that firm 
size can be a strong statistical predictor of the use of bank lines of credit as large firms 
are likely to have more access to this source of financing. This suggests large firms may 
have weaker precautionary motives and be less responsive to deviations from target cash 
holdings due to lower costs of deviations from target cash holdings and hence experience 
slower speeds of adjustments. However, it can be also argued that as these firms are likely 
to face lower costs of adjustments due to better access to external financing sources, they 
can adjust toward their targets at lower costs, thus suggesting faster adjustments. Similarly, 
firms with low cash flow volatility may adjust either slowly for they are less likely to be 
affected by negative cash flow shocks (lower costs of deviations) or quickly as they tend 
to be matured firms with better access to external financing sources (lower costs of adjust-
ments). To examine how these factors affect firms’ target adjustments, I develop following 





) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with small size (CHitSS), low 
cash flow volatility (CHitLCFV), low dividend payout (CHitLDPO), low growth opportuni-
ties (CHitLGO) or young age (CHitY) (big size (CHitBS), high cash flow volatility (CHitHCFV), 
high dividend payout (CHitHDPO), high growth opportunities (CHitHGO) or old age (CHitO)) 
and 0 otherwise.9 Next, I let these firm-specific characteristics interact with firms’ devia-
tions from target cash holdings to examine how they jointly determine firms’ target adjust-
ments. This may allow me to identify which factors have the first-order effects on these 
adjustments.
The precautionary motives of cash holdings I first examine the impact of firm size 
by splitting the sample firms into two groups i.e., one with larger size and another with 
smaller size than the median size level. Panel A of Table 7 shows that large firms in Ger-
many, Japan, the UK, and the US adjust at speeds which are statistically lower than those 
of small firms. This finding supports the argument that large firms with more access to 
external financing sources may be less concerned about deviations from targets but is con-
trary to the argument of Dittmar and Duchin (2010) that big firms with more access to 



































9 For example, in Panel A in Table 7, I divide the sample firms into two subgroups by using the median 
size level i.e., one with larger size (CHitBS) and another with smaller size (CHitBS) than the median size level 
of all firms. In Panel B, I also divide these firms into two subgroups but using the median level of cash flow 
volatility i.e., one with higher levels of cash flow volatility (CHitHCFV) and another with lower levels of cash 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































these sources may adjust faster. I have examined the mechanisms of adjustments of the two 
groups of firms but obtain results that do not form any clear patterns.
The interaction between firm size and whether firms have above- or below-target cash 
holdings does not change the above pattern as small firms (except for French firms) overall 
adjust toward their targets faster whether they experience above- or below-target cash hold-
ings except for a few cases. For example, it turns out that in the presence of below-target 
(above-target) cash holdings, speeds of adjustments of small firms in the UK (the US) now 
do not statistically differ from those of large firms in the country.10
Next, I investigate the impact of firms’ cash flow volatility on their adjustments by split-
ting the sample firms into two subgroups based on the median level of cash flow volatility. 
Firms with riskier cash flows may face higher costs of deviations from targets as they are 
more likely to experience negative cash flow shocks which may strongly affect their opera-
tions (e.g., their ability to meet debt obligations, finance working capital, and undertake 
growth opportunities) (Opler et  al. 1999; Almeida et  al. 2005; Bates et  al. 2009). From 
Panel B of Table 7, there is strong evidence that these firms adjust faster than those with 
low cash flow volatility, which fits nicely with the argument that these firms are more likely 
to be affected by negative cash flow shocks, thus facing higher costs of deviations from tar-
gets. That evidence also supports Bakke and Gu (2017) who find that diversified firms tend 
to hold less cash and experience less cash flow volatility, thus possibly having lower target 
cash holdings and fewer incentives to adjust toward their targets.
Cash flow volatility has a less pronounced impact on firms’ target cash holdings adjust-
ments when this variable is interacted with firms’ deviations from targets. Although by 
magnitude, firms with high cash flow volatility adjust faster whether they have above- or 
below-target cash holdings (except for firms with below-target cash holdings and high cash 
flow volatility in Japan), their speeds of adjustments do not statistically differ from those of 
firms with low cash flow volatility among firms with above-target cash holdings in France, 
Germany, the UK, and the US and those with below-target cash holdings in France, Japan, 
and the UK.
Dividend payout may also influence firms’ adjustments as external investors may 
observe firms with higher dividend payout to be less risky, suggesting better access to capi-
tal markets and low costs of adjustments (Bates et al. 2009). Consistent with Bates et al. 
(2009) that the precautionary motive of cash holdings should be weaker for firms which 
pay more dividends, firms in France, Japan, and the UK which pay more dividends adjust 
statistically less quickly than those which pay less dividends (Panel C of Table 7).
When dividend payout is interacted with firms’ deviations from targets, I find some dif-
ferent results. For example, speeds of adjustments for French firms with high dividend pay-
out do not statistically differ from those of firms with low dividend payout among both 
groups of firms with above- and those with below-target cash holdings although by magni-
tude, firms with low dividend payout still adjust faster. This is a similar story for firms with 
below-target cash holdings in Japan.
Financial constraints Financial constraints i.e., growth opportunities and dividend pay-
out may also influence firms’ cash holdings adjustments. As I have discussed the impact of 
dividend payout, here I only focus on that of growth opportunities. Almeida et al. (2002) 
suggest that the benefit of achieving optimal cash holdings may be higher for high-growth 
firms since it helps them avoid situations where a cash shortage forces them to give up 
10 Controlling for size and other firm-specific characteristics, I find strong evidence that firms with above-
target cash holdings adjust statistically faster than those with below-target cash holdings.
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positive NPV investments. Agency theories, however, suggest that these firms tend to be 
subject to more information asymmetries which lead to less access to external capital mar-
kets i.e., less ability to adjust via CFF.
Panel D of Table  7 reveals that by magnitude, except for firms in Japan, firms in all 
other countries experience faster speeds of adjustments when having more growth oppor-
tunities. High-growth firms in France and the US adjust statistically faster than their low-
growth counterparts. The evidence for Japanese firms is somewhat puzzling as the pres-
ence of limited growth opportunities leads to faster adjustments. The interaction between 
growth opportunities and deviations from targets reduces the statistical relevance of growth 
opportunities. For example, the presence of more growth opportunities does not lead to sta-
tistically faster speeds of adjustments among both firms with above-target cash holdings in 
France and the US and those with below-target cash holdings in France.
Corporate life-cycle Finally, I investigate how firms’ age may influence their target cash 
holdings adjustments since it can be reasonably considered as a proxy for their reputa-
tion and access to external financing sources (Diamond 1991). Dittmar and Duchin (2010) 
show that as firms’ age increases, the precautionary motive of cash holdings may become 
weaker. It is therefore likely that matured firms may hold less cash and adjust less quickly 
than younger firms. To test the impact of firms’ age, I divide the sample firms into two sub-
samples—young firms whose age is less than and matured firms whose age is higher than 
the median age level.
Panel E of Table 7 shows strong evidence across firms in five countries that the precau-
tionary motive of cash holdings may be weaker for matured firms. In particular, matured 
firms adjust toward their targets at speeds from 0.326 (Japanese firms) to 0.440 (US firms), 
statistically slower than those for young firms (from 0.456 (French firms) to 0.531 (UK 
firms)). Letting firms’ age interact with their deviations from targets, I find that young 
firms adjust faster whether they experience above- or below-target cash holdings, except 
for a few cases i.e., speeds of adjustments for young firms in France and the UK are not 
statistically different from those for matured firms in these two countries in the presence of 
below-target cash holdings. Young firms with above-target cash holdings experience fastest 
speeds of adjustments among the four groups of firms.
Overall, I show that firms’ precautionary motives of cash holdings, financial constraints, 
and corporate life-cycle may generally influence their cash holdings adjustments although 
their impact tends to become less significant when I interact these factors with deviations 
from target cash holdings (except for firm age). The impact of deviations from target cash 
holdings, however, remains strong and significant even when these factors are taken into 
account. This suggests that firms’ deviations from target cash holdings may be the major 
driver of their target adjustments, not firm-specific characteristics.
6  Concluding remarks
Consistent with the trade-off view of corporate cash holdings, I find that there is asym-
metry in not only firms’ speeds but also mechanisms of adjustments. In particular, firms 
with above-target cash holdings generally disgorge their excess cash by reducing CFF 
(across firms in all the sample countries) and CFO (except for firms in the UK and the 
US) but increasing CFI (across firms in all the sample countries) while those with below-
target cash holdings undertake opposite mechanisms to build up their cash reserves. Since 
the mechanisms undertaken by the former firms may incur lower costs, they can adjust 
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relatively faster than the latter firms. Further, firms with above-target cash holdings adjust 
toward their targets mainly through changes in CFF and CFI while those with below-target 
cash holdings undertake major adjustments in CFO. The evidence on the asymmetry in the 
adjustments in CFO and CFI undertaken by these two groups of firms is particularly novel. 
Previous studies in the area tend to treat adjustments in firms’ CFO and CFI as exogenous, 
independent of firms’ cash and leverage management policies but I now explicitly account 
for these to get a better insight into firms’ cash holdings behaviors.
In my additional analyses, I find evidence that contrary to firms with small deviations 
from target cash holdings, those with large deviations may undertake faster adjustments 
due to lower costs of adjustments and higher costs of deviations, a finding in favor of both 
the “shared” fixed cost argument and agency theories. Intriguingly, I find that, consistent 
with agency theories, firms with a lot of excess cash may not use it very effectively. This 
problem is particularly prominent among firms with poor corporate governance (French 
and Japanese firms in particular). However, when having less cash than optimal levels, 
firms try hard to improve their operational efficiency.
Finally, I document some evidence on the impact of firms’ precautionary motives of 
cash holdings, financial constraints, and corporate life-cycle on their target cash holdings 
adjustments. I find evidence that firms adjust toward their target cash holdings faster con-
tingent on having smaller size, higher cash flow volatility, lower dividend payout, more 
growth opportunities, and younger age. When these factors are interacted with firms’ devi-
ations from targets, however, their influence on firms’ target adjustments tends to become 
less significant in most cases (except for firm age), suggesting that firms’ deviations from 
targets may be a more important driver of their target cash holdings adjustments.
Overall, the study contributes to the cash holdings literature by focusing on the asym-
metry in the mechanisms undertaken by firms to move toward their target cash holdings 
levels. The findings complement the existing evidence on the asymmetry in firms’ speeds 
of adjustments reported by previous studies within this literature.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: Variable definition
Variable Definition
Asset tangibility (AT) Fixed assets scaled by the book value of total assets
Balance sheet net debt (BSND) The difference between the book value of total debt and cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by the book value of total assets
Book leverage (BL) The ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total 
assets
Cash (CH) Cash and cash equivalents scaled by the book value of total assets
Cash dividends Cash dividends paid scaled by the book value of total assets
Cash holdings change (CH change) The difference between cash holdings in the current and the last 
accounting periods scaled by the book value of total assets
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Variable Definition
Cash flows (CF) Operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, income 
taxes and total dividends paid scaled by the book value of total 
assets
Cash flows from financing (CFF) Net cash flow from financing activities (net cash receipts and disburse-
ments resulting from reduction and/or increase in long or short term 
debt, proceeds from sale of stock, stock repurchased/redeemed/
retired, dividends paid and other financing activities) scaled by the 
book value of total assets
Cash flows from investing (CFI) Net cash flow from investing activities (net cash receipts and disburse-
ments resulting from capital expenditures, decrease/increase from 
investments, disposal of fixed assets, increase in other assets and 
other investing activities) scaled by the book value of total assets
Cash flows from operating (CFO) Net cash flow from operating activities (net cash receipts and disburse-
ments resulting from the operations of the firm i.e., the sum of funds 
from operations, funds from/used for other operating activities and 
extraordinary items) scaled by the book value of total assets
Cash flow volatility (CFV) The absolute value of the difference between the first difference of 
cash flow (% change) and the average of first differences
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) Capital expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets
Equity proceeds Net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred equity scaled 
by the book value of total assets
Equity repurchases Common/preferred equity purchased, retired, converted, and redeemed 
scaled by the book value of total assets
Firm size (FS) The natural log of the book value of total assets measured in 1980 
US$ value
Growth opportunities (GO) The market-to-book ratio (the market value of total assets (the sum 
of the market value of equity or market capitalization and the book 
value of total debt) scaled by the book value of total assets)
Market leverage (ML) The ratio of the book value of total debt to the market value of total 
assets (the sum of the market value of equity (market capitalization) 
plus the book value of total debt)
Net debt issue The sum of net long-term debt issue (long-term borrowings minus 
long-term debt reductions) and increase/decrease in short-term bor-
rowing scaled by the book value of total assets
Net equity issue The net difference between equity proceeds and equity repurchases
Net working capital (NWC) The difference between working capital and cash and cash equivalents 
scaled by the book value of total assets
Research and development (R&D) Research and development expenses scaled by total sales
Working capital Funds from/for other operating activities scaled by the book value of 
total assets
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